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PARTING SHOT
By Vijay Fafat
Panic rooms and flutters in 
financial markets.
It’s been more than a decade since Nietzsche’s Abyss 
stared right back at us. The pebbles of financial crisis 
dislodged in mid-2007 led to an avalanche that peaked in 
December 2008. But for many, the surrealism of that 
fourth quarter has faded. The sentiment Irving Fisher expressed 
two weeks before the 1929 stock market crash appears to 
be back in vogue: “Stock prices have reached what looks 
like a permanently high plateau.” The new bulls have 
thundered on with a Midas touch to their hooves, swatting 
aside every obstacle that would have seemed momentous and 
perilous in any other age—including Brexit and the subsequent 
fumblings of the British government; the Great Trade War 
between the U.S. and China; North Korean missile launches 
over Japan; the Chinese foreign exchange reserve crisis and 
the fear of another Asian contagion; the structural weaknesses 
in emerging markets; and the multiple incidents of terrorism.
There have been warning dips along the way, but in 
retrospect, they look more like the pauses of drink breaks 
in a marathon run. So the questions arise: Is the stock 
market overvalued? Are there clouds heralding a crash just 
over our short-sighted horizon?
“Hypothesis non fingo,” Sir Issac Newton had said 
when he didn’t know better. I frame no hypotheses either, 
for that directional view is not the purpose of this article. 
I only offer a few cautionary thoughts here on why we 
overshoot in our optimism and why even genius comes to 
grief in the face of capricious, mercurial capital markets. 
There are aspects here that investors can evaluate, and 
facets that they can control, most notably with the flow 
of their money and their proxy votes. Institutions, on 
the other hand, certainly have more 
power to manage these risks as part 
of their cultural fabric if they look 
beyond their next earnings quarter, 
and their independent directors remain 
truly independent. 
The factors mentioned below apply 
against the juggernaut today just as 
much as they did a decade ago. How we 
deal with them collectively will determine 
whether we land softly in the next 
trough or face a hard landing with 
rippling effects.
Greed
‘Anything in excess is poison’—these 
are words of great knowledge. Greed is 
good—it drives capitalism in part. But 
unbridled avarice saddled with power 
and ambition has brought many an 
empire to ruin. ‘If it is good with a 
grain, it is better with a bushel’ is a 
thought that may work in some 
instances of economies of scale, with 
pooled mutual funds and good-sized 
nations—but beyond a limit, there are 
negative returns. Size matters, but 
recall that even Soviet Russia and the 
British Empire collapsed when they 
became too big to govern.
Leveraged portfolios, like leveraged 
homes, must be within your wherewithal. 
Ask if a 30-50 percent wipe-out of 
your portfolio will give you a heart 
attack. Reach only as far as your purse 
strings will safely allow. A very telling 
statistic comes from the 1929 crash. 
At one point, the stock market was 
down 50 percent from its highs. It must 
have seemed like a dream opportunity 
to buy on the large dip. Those who 
went in at that point lost 80 percent 
of their investment subsequently.
Of course, this by no means 
implies that you shouldn’t buy when 
opportunity presents itself. It does 
caution, though, that no matter how 
good an opportunity looks, the greed 
in grasping at it must stay tempered. 
A falling knife is still a knife when 
you’re trying to catch it mid-flight. 
Hubris
We all suffer to varying degrees from 
what is known as ‘illusory superiority’. 
This is the phenomenon where we 
significantly overestimate our own 
abilities while magnifying the perceived 
shortcomings in others to create our 
own version of reality: an enlarged 
feeling of infallibility. This is particularly 
true for investments in more esoteric 
or illiquid securities. After a while, an 
AA tranche of a collateralised debt 
obligation (CDO) looks the same as 
an AA corporate bond, not because 
portfolio managers do not understand 
the difference, but because they think 
they understand their own CDO better. 
They rely on their own correlation 
analysis based on selective research 
that reinforces their positive bias and 
remain convinced that any downturn or 
spike in credit defaults is a short-term 
course correction that will be shrugged 
off by the market bulls. 
One week before Bear Stearns 
went down, TV pundits were proudly 
proclaiming it to be a “strong buy”, 
completely disregarding its liquidity 
problems.1 Mortgage-backed securities 
could not be snapped up fast enough 
in early 2007, regardless of composition 
and tranching, because of the firm 
conviction that housing prices could 
never fall. Leveraged and synthetic 
CDOs were touted as the newest 
financial technology to transform the 
financing world, with no regard to the 
terrible risks involved. These are just 
a few specific paths along which the 
investment managers were misguided 
right before the 2008 crisis. We don’t 
have to go back to the Long-Term 
Capital Management episode of the 
1990s to highlight what hubris can do 
to an investment strategy.
To be sure, many portfolio managers 
do succeed in obtaining spectacular 
returns. Then again, there will always 
be the one lucky or unscrupulous 
risk-taker who will come out ahead in a 
barrel of a hundred playing at the 
gambling table. Hubris may pay off for 
a few, but many will fall on their faces.
Moral hazard
There are often vices in our affairs 
because people feel a need to negotiate 
with what may have once been sacrosanct 
principles. The degree of compromise 
is determined by circumstances such 
as incentive schemes, opportunities, 
personal ethics and credo, role models, 
delegated authority, and the implicit 
and explicit controls in place. Where 
there is much money and power, 
the temptation of moral hazard can be 
hard to resist. 
While some may merely cut corners, 
others will saw off the entire bend 
to achieve their objectives. These include 
acts of self-interest—insider trading, 
outright fraud and cooking the books.
When the piper stops playing the tune, 
we all pay with our coins for the show 
through government bailouts. Recall 
the uncritical, nonsensical ratings the 
supposedly independent and analytical 
rating agencies handed out to exotic 
No matter how good 
an opportunity looks, 
the greed in grasping at 
it must stay tempered. A 
falling knife is still a knife 
when you’re trying to 
catch it mid-fl ight.
instruments simply to maintain market 
share and ill-gotten rating fees—
Madoff’s fraudulent funds and Enron 
were just two of thousands of capital 
markets scams which had brought 
investors chasing easy returns to grief. 
Even a prestigious firm like Arthur 
Andersen was brought down due to its 
complicity in such fraudulent activity. 
Confidence and 
subjective probabilities
Humans have a habit of overestimating 
their prospects in a given wager while 
underestimating its adversity when they 
are in a state of equilibrium and the 
sun is shining. The illusory rainbow 
extends over the horizon and the 
potential tiger behind the bush is 
forgotten. This should be a little 
surprising because our risk-averse 
utility functions are actually poised in 
the opposite direction. Normally, we 
apply a significantly stronger negative 
factor to adverse outcomes compared 
to the positive premium we attach to 
happy occurrences.
These contradictory directives are 
conveniently ensconced in our world-
view, even though we are quite aware of 
their opposing natures. They colour our 
approach to opportunities and pitfalls. 
Likely, this happens not because we 
set aside our risk aversion but because 
we end up significantly misestimating 
the probabilities involved, giving easier 
reins to our natural fears. Such unseen 
mistakes become dogma in decision-
making, for it is in our nature to fortify 
our errors against informed correction. 
Can a mountain of circumstantial 
evidence of dubious reliability be 
ignored in one’s gut, when hope and 
greed lurk?
Myopic exuberance
We may remember the pain of 
the Asian and Russian crises, the 
tech bubble, the liquidity crisis of 
2007-08, but we have this remarkable 
ability to convince ourselves that this 
time will be different. This time, the 
markets are rising rationally. This time, 
the investors are more prudent. This 
time, the pull of the lever really is the 
one favouring the brave.
This is not hubris. It is the 
persistent, short-sighted, irrational 
belief that the world of dice is non-
Markovian, that a string of bad throws 
will be followed by that of good ones, 
and good fortune will persistently 
follow good fortune. In the long run, 
risk is rewarded, but we forget that this 
does not apply to individual outcomes 




The herd effect of instinctive sheep 
following the shepherd remains a large 
factor in market bubbles. We feel 
ebullient when others display a 
confident charge into the raging 
Humans have a habit of overestimating 
their prospects in a given wager while 
underestimating its adversity when they 
are in a state of equilibrium and the sun 
is shining.
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as an example. There are tranches, and then there are tranches. You cannot 
expect to have a third party label them AA or BB and rest complacently. But we did, 
and we do. The error is in the act of losing sight of the fact that such instruments 
remain radioactive even when locked up and forgotten inside wooden drawers. 
For people who have not been burnt before, and even for many who have been, 
such lessons are hard to understand before the fact.
Panic rooms and flutters
When the compass points South, the ones who get out first escape and set off 
the avalanche. When panic rooms are activated, the pendulum of our subjective 
probabilities swings to the other side, utility functions curve significantly, and we 
create our own self-fulfilling prophecies. That is just the nature of all chaotic 
systems—there is a critical threshold beyond which the system breaks out of a stable 
attractor and escapes the basin uncontrollably. A butterfly flutters in Florida’s 
housing market and the resulting hurricane savages the Pacific Rim.
A Ponzi scheme, or a financial system dissociated from real economy, survives only 
as long as there is a steady supply of gullibility. Bitcoin and tulip bulbs come to mind.
In the end, we must look back at ourselves before we look at others. We all have 
visions of control in our lives. There is nothing wrong in strong convictions and 
beliefs, but temper them with a modest amount of doubt and caution. Today may 
seem very different from a decade or two ago, and it is. It is much riskier. We have 
newer instruments to play with, like cryptocurrencies and tokens, and better 
technologies, like Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain, whose implications we 
do not fully comprehend. The increase in financial inclusiveness from a myriad of 
Fintechs is also enabling more people to be able to play with fire—fire with which 
they have not been singed directly in the past.
The myopia of control replays itself at all levels, in every aspect of our lives. 
As Dr Ian Malcolm reflected ruefully in the movie Jurassic Park, “You never had 
control, that’s the illusion! I was overwhelmed by the power of this place. But I 
made a mistake, too, I didn’t have enough respect for that power and it’s out now.”2
While investing, discount everything you think you understand, and keep your 
fear of missing out in check. 
Even Aristotle was felled. Taste your hemlock with care.
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waters. Once a small herd follows a leader on little 
more than rumour or reputation, this ‘second- and 
third-party confidence’ provides a reassuring validation 
to the original perpetrators, fuelling further leaps of 
daring. By their own petards are such castles sometimes 
hauled upward, with little capital in their foundation. And 
that works in reverse as well. In today’s hyper-connected 
environment where social media can fan a spark into a 
forest fire, and where fake news from malicious bots can 
catch on as gospel truth, the risk of a snowballing market 
crash is all too real.
We all like to think that we can analyse markets well 
and not fall victim to the temporary momentum effects. But 
repeatedly, we buy into our own hype—a case of falling for 
circular rumour. Before the 2008 crisis, how many stalwart 
banks with their armies of Ph.D. quants loaded up their own 
balance sheets with garbage securities (which do have a 
place in the world—but for high-yield speculators, not staid 
banks) or non-performing assets? Take a look at any large 
bank’s balance sheet from 2006 for proof. It has taken many 
of these banks a decade to offload those toxic assets they had 
built up on their balance sheets. For example, Deutsche Bank 
has made not one, but two separate attempts at hiving off 
those toxic assets in its ‘bad bank’, with book value exceeding 
US$100 billion.
Is this happening currently? Perhaps we should look at 
all the non-performing loans loaded up on the balance sheets 
of Chinese and Indian banks...
Simulacra or experience
We forget that models are mere representations and 
approximations of what are incredibly complex processes. 
In the process, we forget simple aphorisms. We get enamoured 
by models, and models are high maintenance, especially when 
they misbehave. 
In the utopian world where we have convinced one another 
that the Gaussian distribution rules, black swans never come 
back to their lake to roost, and home prices never fall (as the 
U.S. rating agencies assumed prior to the 2008 crisis). 
Fat-tail events have again faded from view. Do our models really 
represent the world in which we live or are we just inventing 
Ptolemaic models of epicycles within epicycles instead of 
creating fundamental value?
One cannot become a pundit by proxy. Knowledge 
obtained cheaply is not respected. On a similar note, practical 
knowledge never obtained also matters! Take securitisation 
We all like to think that we can analyse 
markets well and not fall victim to the 
temporary momentum effects. But 
repeatedly, we buy into our own hype.
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